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Abstract: The Rowlands target article makes a case, based on John Locke’s metaphysical 
argument, that personhood can be applied to many species beyond a few nonhuman primates. 
The problem with this argument is that personhood has an open-ended list of defining attributes 
and can, at best only be partially applied to nonhuman species. Therefore, a dichotomous 
distinction cannot be made between qualifying and non-qualifying species. Instead, between-
species comparisons must be based on observational and experimental procedures to 
demonstrate the extent to which human mental attributes are shared with other species. This 
would allow a more informed view about the appropriateness of personhood in nonhumans.  
 
      
James King is Professor Emeritus of 
Psychology, University of Arizona. His 
research has focused on primate 
behavior including complex learning, 
infant development, behavioral 
laterality, and most recently 
personality and subjective well-being. 
http://bit.ly/JamesKingArizona   
 
 
Using John Locke’s metaphysical approach to defining human personhood, Rowlands (2016) 
argues for extending personhood to nonhumans. The metaphysical approach to defining 
personhood is based on defining “what something is,” namely, what features it has that confer 
on it the status of a “person.”  Since metaphysical concepts cannot be seen directly, this 
definition comes close to being circular. 
 Rowlands’s specific claim is that a necessary condition for personhood is a capability for 
pre-reflective awareness, an ability to perceive some event without necessarily having an 
understanding of the fact that one is aware of that perception. In other words, pre-reflective 
awareness does not imply the presence of an intentional state. The final conclusion is that there 
is a “unity” of awareness and mental life that constitutes the basis for personhood.  
 A fundamental problem with Rowlands’s argument is illustrated by his example of a 
chimpanzee who avoids a desirable food when a more dominant chimpanzee is nearby. Was this 
a case of higher order intentionality where the submissive chimpanzee knows what the 
dominant chimpanzee is thinking or is it simply “behavior-reading?” Rowlands suggests that 
even if it is merely behavior-reading, the chimpanzee meets Locke’s test because it passes the 
test for pre-reflective awareness. In a well-controlled test Hare, Call, & Tomasello (2001) 
showed that a submissive chimpanzee’s willingness to take food in the presence of a dominant 
chimpanzee depended upon whether or not the dominant chimpanzee’s view of the food was 
obscured behind a barrier. The submissive chimpanzee’s behaviors were consistent with 
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reflective awareness and a higher order intentionality and therefore exceeded Locke’s criterion 
for personhood. The low bar of mere pre-reflective awareness would allow attribution of 
personhood to an absurdly large number of species, primate and non-primate, who would fail 
Hare’s test but still pass a less restrictive test for pre-reflective awareness. 
 As shown by the target article, a metaphysical approach can be applied to human-
centered mental traits. This is possible because terms such as “self,” “implicit,” reflective,” and 
“nonreflective awareness,” “mental life,” and “mental unity” have commonly accepted, 
dictionary-based definitions that can be further refined by metaphysical arguments based on 
human mentality. However, a critical point is that when mentalistic terms are applied across 
species, they are only meaningful when based on empirical, data-based evidence. Furthermore, 
whether these terms, including personhood, are applicable to nonhuman species cannot be 
answered by a simple yes or no.  
“Nature abhors a dichotomy.” Evolution in particular abhors a dichotomy for any trait, 
including species differences in cognitively or mentally related traits. The problem is that 
descriptions of human traits are open-ended; they are not defined by one specific set of criteria, 
but by consistency with a list of many criteria that can be augmented at any time and will also 
vary across species. Attributing the trait of mentality thus becomes a moving target: criteria 
change often, depending on the viewpoint of the researcher and the context of the data 
collection. When a mentalistic term is applied to a nonhuman species, some of the human 
criteria for the term typically generalize to the nonhuman whereas others do not. This is 
illustrated by examples of three human characteristics that have been partially expressed in 
great apes: language, morality, and personality. These characteristics do not specifically involve 
personhood but are relevant to the general argument for animal personhood. 
 After the first evidence that a chimpanzee could learn to understand and produce sign 
language (Gardner & Gardner, 1969) a cascade of criticism emerged (and continues to this day) 
claiming that the chimpanzee’s performance was not related to language but a simpler 
phenomenon (e.g., Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch 2002). A large body of well-controlled research 
(Gillespie-Lynch, Greenfield, Lynn, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 2014) nevertheless confirmed that 
bonobos are capable of mastering many attributes of human language, including generativity or 
productivity (ability to understand novel sentences). In addition, bonobos are capable of 
engaging in informal conversations with humans, responding to spoken English with words by 
means of a hand-held keyboard. 
  Recent research has demonstrated that chimpanzees have a rudimentary sense of 
morality in their interactions with conspecifics. Examples include the preference of food-sharing 
chimpanzees for a token providing food for itself and a conspecific over a token providing food 
only for itself (Horner, Carter, Suchak, & de Waal, 2011), as well as more general sharing 
(Warneka & Tomasello, 2015) and empathy (de Waal, 2008) among conspecifics. 
 The third domain showing a continuity between humans and animals is the structure of 
personality differences. King & Figueredo (1994) demonstrated a similarity between the human 
Big Five personality dimensions (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, 
and Openness) and personality dimensions of chimpanzees based on personality-descriptive 
adjectives. Orangutans (Weiss, King, & Perkins, 2006) likewise display a personality structure 
resembling that of humans. The relationship of personality dimensions to rated subjective well-
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being in both species is similar to that in humans. There are clear differences across species, but 
the overall similarities underlying the cross-species differences are striking. 
 Alfred Russell Wallace (1910) published a book containing a chapter entitled “Is nature 
cruel?” His remarkable answer was “No.” He justified his answer by claiming that evolutionary 
forces would have inured animals to suffering because responses to the suffering would have 
reduced fitness in the uncertain and dangerous natural habitat. An additional claim was that any 
susceptibility to suffering was directly related to intelligence. Therefore, only humans with their 
intelligence vastly exceeding that of any animal could be susceptible to agonies and suffering. 
Unfortunately, Wallace’s view is still consistent with the attitudes of many people towards 
animals. This view of a dichotomy between humans and nonhumans can be countered by 
showing that animals are sentient, self-aware beings with capacities for suffering, emotions, and 
empathy not unlike our own. The three examples noted above are consistent with a narrowing 
of the human-animal distinction and not only refute Wallace’s assertion but are also relevant to 





de Waal, F. B. M. (2008). Putting the altruism back into altruism: The evolution of empathy. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 279-300. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093625  
Gardner, R. A., & Gardner, B. T. (1969). Teaching sign language to a chimpanzee. Science, 109, 
664-672.  
Gillespie-Lynch, K., Greenfield, P. M., Lynn, H., & Savage-Rumbaugh, S. (2014). Gestural and 
symbolic development among apes and humans: Support for a multimodal theory of 
language evolution. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1-10. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01228 
Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomesello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? Animal 
Behaviour, 61, 139-151. doi:10.1006/anbe.2001.1518 
Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. T. (2002). The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, 
and how did it evolve? Science, 298, 1569-1579. doi:10.1126/science.298.5598.1569  
King, J. E., & Figueredo, A. J. (1997). The Five-Factor model plus dominance in chimpanzee 
personality. Journal of Research in Personality, 31, 257-271. doi:10.1006 
Rowlands, M. (2016). Are animals persons? Animal Sentience 2016.101. 
Wallace, A. R. (1910). The world of life. London: Chapman and Hall. 
Warneken, F., & Tomasellso, M. (2015). The development and evolutionary origins of human 
helping and sharing. In D. C. Schroeder & W. D. Graziano (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of 
prosocial behavior (pp. 100-113). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Weiss, A., King, J. E., & Perkins, L. (2006). Personality and subjective well-being in orangutans. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 501-511. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.90.3.501 
